“You May Refuse Sanction, But Can You Refuse FIR?”: Supreme Court Raps UP Police Over Hate Crime Provisions

Introduction

In a pointed hearing underscoring the legal obligations of police authorities at the stage of FIR registration, the Supreme Court on Tuesday sharply questioned the Uttar Pradesh Police for failing to invoke hate crime–related provisions of the Indian Penal Code in an FIR concerning an alleged attack on a Muslim cleric in Noida. The Court emphasised that departmental enquiries against erring officers cannot substitute compliance with statutory duties, particularly when allegations prima facie disclose serious offences affecting communal harmony.

The observations were made in Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., W.P.(Crl.) No. 391/2021, by a Bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta.

Background Of The Case

The petitioner, Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani, a Muslim cleric based in Noida, alleged that he was attacked in 2021 by a group of individuals on account of his religious identity. According to the petitioner, the assault involved verbal abuse, physical violence, and acts intended to humiliate him because he was Muslim.

Despite repeated representations, the petitioner alleged that the police authorities initially refused to register an FIR. Eventually, after directions to produce the case diary, an FIR was registered — but only for general offences relating to bodily harm and theft, without invoking IPC provisions dealing with hate crimes, such as Sections 153B and 295A.

Aggrieved by what he described as a diluted and selective registration of offences, the petitioner approached the Supreme Court seeking a fair investigation and action against police officials for failure to register the FIR under appropriate provisions.

Arguments By The Petitioner

Appearing for the petitioner, Senior Advocate Huzefa Ahmadi argued that the incident was not an isolated one and reflected a broader pattern of reluctance by authorities to acknowledge hate-motivated crimes.

He submitted that although an FIR was eventually registered, the police deliberately avoided invoking provisions such as:

Section 153B IPC (imputations prejudicial to national integration), and
Section 295A IPC (deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings).

Ahmadi further contended that the allegations — including pulling of the beard, use of abusive language, and humiliation linked to religious identity — clearly attracted IPC provisions dealing with offences against religious feelings and communal harmony.

Court’s Initial Observations

During the hearing, Justice Vikram Nath noted that the Supreme Court had recently reserved orders in a batch of petitions relating to hate speech and hate crimes across the country. However, the Bench clarified that the present case was being examined on its own facts, independent of those broader challenges.

Justice Sandeep Mehta, at an early stage, expressed scepticism and observed that prima facie the offences might not be made out, suggesting that the trial court could take a view in due course.

When Ahmadi relied upon Section 298 IPC (uttering words with deliberate intent to wound religious feelings), Justice Mehta questioned how the alleged acts amounted to injury to religious feelings, particularly focusing on whether the allegations crossed the statutory threshold.

Issue Of Sanction Under Section 196 CrPC

A crucial aspect of the hearing revolved around Section 196 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which bars courts from taking cognizance of certain offences, including Sections 153B and 295A IPC, without prior government sanction.

Justice Mehta observed that even if cognizance could not be taken without sanction, the absence of sanction could not justify the non-registration of the FIR itself.

He pointedly remarked:

“Even if you were to now go and pray for cognizance of these offences, you can’t do it… S.196 CrPC prohibits cognizance. Unless you register the case, investigate, and if offences are made out seek sanction, how will the case proceed?”

This distinction between registration of FIR, investigation, and grant of sanction formed the core of the Court’s concern.

Supreme Court’s Sharp Questions To The State

The Bench questioned Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj, appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, on why the FIR was not registered under provisions which appeared to be prima facie attracted by the allegations.

The ASG submitted that the omission was attributable to the Investigating Officer, and that disciplinary proceedings had been initiated against the officer concerned.

However, Justice Mehta was unconvinced and observed:

“Initiating enquiry is not an answer to non-registration of FIR under appropriate provisions.”

The Court further asked whether disciplinary action after the fact could cure the failure to register the case correctly in the first place, especially when statutory bars like Section 196 CrPC made proper registration all the more crucial.

“You May Refuse Sanction, But Can You Refuse FIR?”

In one of the most striking moments of the hearing, Justice Mehta posed a fundamental question to the State:

“You may refuse sanction, but can you refuse registration of FIR?”

The Bench emphasised that registration of an FIR is a statutory duty, and the question of sanction arises only at the stage of cognizance. Unless the FIR is registered under appropriate sections and investigation carried out, the legal process itself is stalled.

When the ASG conceded that an FIR ought to have been registered, Justice Mehta urged the State to act without waiting for judicial directions. Justice Nath added that the only options before the State were either to take corrective steps immediately or invite formal directions from the Court.

The ASG was ultimately granted one week’s time to obtain instructions.

Court Declines To Generalise The Issue

Towards the end of the hearing, Ahmadi submitted that such incidents were occurring frequently across the country and posed a threat to national integrity. The Bench, however, declined to give the case a broader colour, noting the absence of empirical material.

Justice Mehta clarified that the Court was dealing with an individual grievance, while assuring that the petition had been entertained and appropriate action was expected from the State.

Significance Of The Hearing

Although no final order was passed, the hearing is significant for several reasons:

It reiterates that failure to invoke appropriate IPC provisions at the FIR stage cannot be justified by procedural technicalities.
It clarifies the distinction between FIR registration and sanction for prosecution, an issue often misunderstood or misused.
It sends a strong message that disciplinary enquiries against officers do not absolve the State of its statutory obligations.
It reinforces judicial scrutiny over the handling of alleged hate-motivated offences.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s observations in Kazeem Ahmad Sherwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh underline a fundamental principle of criminal law — that access to justice begins with proper registration of offences. By questioning the reluctance of the police to invoke hate crime provisions, the Court has reaffirmed that statutory safeguards protecting communal harmony cannot be bypassed at the threshold stage.

As the matter awaits further instructions from the State, the case serves as an important reminder that procedural compliance is not optional, particularly when allegations involve offences with serious constitutional and societal implications.